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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan and Miriam Lanskoy 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin returns (briefly); shakes up apparat 
President Yel'tsin took a break from his hospital routine to put in a few hours at 
the Kremlin on Monday, 7 December. As a result of his sojourn, Valentin 
Yumashev, Yevgeni Savostyanov, Mikhail Komissar, and surprisingly, the 
Kremlin veteran and FAPSI Chief General Aleksandr Starovoitov have been 
sacked; Yuri Yarov was relieved of his administrative tasks and named Yel'tsin's 
representative to the Federation Council; and General Nikolai Bordyuzha, 
secretary of the Security Council, has been tapped to replace Yumashev as chief 
of staff. Yel'tsin has also decided to assume direct presidential supervision of the 
Justice Ministry and the Tax Police. 
 
One theory on the dismissal of FAPSI Chief Starovoitov suggests that his 
removal was a precondition for Bordyuzha's acceptance of the chief of staff 
position. Bordyuzha served briefly, and apparently unhappily, in the Starovoitov-
directed FAPSI. The new head of FAPSI is Starovoitov's former deputy, Vladislav 
Sherstyuk. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Dec 98; nexis) Sherstyuk holds the rank of Colonel-
General and formerly worked in a technical section of the USSR KGB. He was 
appointed a deputy director of FAPSI in 1995. Another former FAPSI staffer, 
Vladimir Makarov, who was a deputy director from 1992 until his retirement from 
the service in 1994, has been named a deputy chief of the President's 
administration. (Russian Public Television, 1800 GMT, 7 Dec 98; BBC, 9 Dec 
98/nexis) 
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ORT shares flap 
Boris Berezovsky's allegation that he had turned over 26% of Russian Public 
Television (ORT) to President Yel'tsin was, in part, confirmed by former Kremlin 
security chief Aleksandr Korzhakov. According to Korzhakov, Berezovsky gave 
him notice of power of attorney transferring rights to the ORT shares to President 
Yel'tsin in 1994. 
 
While Yel'tsin's press secretary, Yakushkin, denied that ORT shares were 
transferred to "the President's ownership or control," (Radio Mayak Network, 
1636 GMT, 18 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-323) he conceded that someone could 
have "transferred warrants" without the recipient's knowledge.  
 
Deputy chief of the Presidential Staff Yevgeni Savostyanov, when asked to 
comment on the ORT shares issue, claimed that "The President was assigned 
the right to them [ORT shares] only for the duration of his term of office." 
(Segodnya, 26 Nov 98; BBC, 28 Nov 98/nexis) Control of a significant stake in 
Russian Public Television is apparently considered a presidential perquisite. 
 
In later comments, Korzhakov further asserted that Boris Berezovsky is 
blackmailing the president and his family, threatening to publish scandalous 
material "if he is touched." (Interfax, 1236 GMT, 26 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-330) 
 
APPARAT 
Yastrzhembsky joins Luzhkov's team 
Whether or not Sergei Yastrzhembsky's support for Yuri Luzhkov as prime 
ministerial candidate in September caused his abrupt dismissal from Yel'tsin's 
staff, we can at least confirm his general sympathy for Luzhkov now, as he has 
just joined the Moscow city government as a deputy prime minister in charge of 
public and interregional ties. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1011 GMT, 18 Nov 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98- 322) It also seems likely that Yastrzhembsky will play a significant 
role in Luzhkov's newly created political movement, Otechestvo. 
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New local government council decreed 
President Yel'tsin has created a new Council on Local Self-Government to 
coordinate between "federal and regional state bodies and local self-government 
for the implementation of state policy." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1110 GMT, 
14 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-319) According to the edict, President Yel'tsin will chair 
the council with Boris Nemtsov as his deputy and a membership of 58, including 
several government ministers, presidential apparatchiks, regional leaders and 
others. This is not the first report to suggest that Nemtsov would be re-involved 
with the current administration, and while he may well take up this position, other 
reports of his involvement have proven inaccurate. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Will 'extremism' re-invigorate the Security Council? 
During a meeting with law enforcement officials (not held under SC auspices), 
the problem of extremism, which SC Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha warned could 
lead to the disintegration of the state, prompted the scheduling of a full Security 
Council session on 20 November to address this topic. Participants in the initial 
meeting discussed "practical steps for control of rallies and marches where 
extremist slogans are often voiced...." (Interfax, 1008 GMT, 13 Nov 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-317) 
 
Following close on the heels of the security officials' gathering, a "routine 
meeting" of the SC Interdepartmental Commission for International Security was 
chaired by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, during which the implementation of 
Russia's national security concept was addressed, in addition to the coordination 
of policy efforts in the international arena. At issue during the Ivanov meeting was 
the maintenance of a unified foreign policy on behalf of all the regions of the 
Russian Federation. The most notable achievement of this commission meeting 
was the assertion of primacy for the foreign ministry in all international issues, 
which may explain why a subsequent document on the composition of the 
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Security Council, issued by the presidential apparat, listed former foreign minister 
and current Prime Minister Primakov first in the SC membership behind the 
president, rather than SC Secretary Bordyuzha as has been the usual practice. 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 1451 GMT, 20 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-324) It 
remains to be seen what impact Bordyuzha's elevation to chief of the President's 
staff will have on the status of the Security Council. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Tax police under investigation... 
A new Governmental Interdepartmental Commission has been established to 
investigate and inspect the operations of the Tax Police. Chaired by Deputy 
Justice Minister Yevgeni Sidorenko, the commission is charged with producing a 
report on the effectiveness of the Tax Police, to be submitted by 15 December. 
Commission membership includes security (foreign and domestic) and finance 
officials, as well as currency and customs officers. (ITAR-TASS, 1218 GMT, 19 
Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-323) 
 
...And privatization policy too 
PM Primakov continues to ponder the crimes of his predecessors. At a recent 
meeting of a council on Far East trade, Primakov vowed to "carry out to the end 
the investigation into illegal privatization." (Interfax, 1135 GMT, 19 Nov 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-323) Primakov's examples of illegal privatization included the 
controversial Svyazinvest auction as well as Purneftegaz. 
 
Rosvooruzhenie leadership battle results in Primakov score 
Igor Maslyukov, who has been agitating for changes in the executive offices of 
Rosvooruzhenie since his appointment in July, has finally attained part of his 
goal: Managing Director Yevgeni Ananev has been replaced. (Interfax, 1334 
GMT, 27 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-331) For Maslyukov, however, the good news 
ends there. The new head of Rosvooruzhenie is not Maslyukov's candidate, but 
rather a former deputy director of the FIS and deputy secretary of the Security 
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Council, Grigori Rapota. (Moscow News, No. 47, 3 Dec 98; nexis) Rapota's 
connection to the once Primakov-led FIS extends beyond his tenure as deputy 
director--he is also the husband of the longtime press spokesperson for the FIS 
director, Tatiana Samolis. This appointment, coming after a hard-fought battle for 
control of the state arms trading company, represents another victory for 
Primakov in his increasingly obvious effort to consolidate both formal and 
informal authority under his personal direction. 
 
What did Mironov do? 
Terse reports on Russian news agencies noted that President Yel'tsin has 
intervened in government personnel policy by dismissing the prime minister's 
expert on military issues, Valeri Mironov. (ITAR-TASS, 1138 GMT, 14 Nov 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-318) Mironov's service in the government predates Primakov's 
appointment as prime minister, but if Primakov had wanted him fired, he could 
easily have used his own authority to dismiss him. We are left wondering why 
President Yel'tsin used his power of decree to dismiss Mironov not only from the 
government but from his military service as well. Could there be a corruption 
scandal brewing here? 
 
FORMER GOVERNMENT 
Kirienko views causes and results of crises 
In the past, Russia's democrats have not been able to unite into a single party or 
movement. Sergei Kirienko, the former prime minister, looks forward to an 
upcoming conference of all the democratic figures on 10 December, but 
recognizes "that it won't be easy" to unite them. Asked if the new democratic 
movement that has taken form since the assassination of Galina Starovoitova will 
aim at establishing a true national party and field candidates in the 1999 Duma 
elections, Kirienko sidestepped the question. "We will work to the presidential 
elections," he said. 
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On 7 December, Kirienko analyzed Russia's recent history from the democratic 
perspective. He stressed that the real cause of Russia's crisis does not reside in 
the sphere of economics but stems from the "lack of a political consensus and a 
resultant weakness of the government. " The belief that the events of 1992 had 
endowed Yel'tsin with a popular mandate to carry out economic reform was an 
"illusion." The population was unprepared for the inevitable hardships and had 
never agreed to take on the heavy burden of reform. For this reason the 
government was not able to formulate and maintain a coherent reform plan. 
Economic reform has not failed in Russia; in fact, it has never been seriously 
undertaken. 
 
According to Kirienko, over the last few years the biggest mistakes were: 1) 
Unrealistic expectations about the pace and ease of reform and an 
underestimation of its costs; 2) Overreliance on macroeconomic measures while 
paying little attention to restructuring enterprises; and 3) The imposition of overly 
high taxes. 
 
The legislature represents the unwillingness of the electorate to carry the weight 
of reform. Consequently, it has prevented a real revision of the state budget, so 
that over the last seven years the size of the budget deficit has actually grown. 
The two branches of government were so bitterly opposed that they were unable 
to agree on a common policy "even under crisis conditions. " 
 
Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov has "without question secured political stability. 
But this is at the cost of no economic action." So far, his government has carried 
out no economic measures and there has been no conflict with the legislature. 
But time is running out and he will have to act to forestall the possibility of 
hyperinflation in the spring. Even the most reactionary members of the current 
government now know that currency emissions will not solve anything. They will 
have to pass a tight budget as a basis for securing credit. 
 
 7 
How will the Communist faction in the Duma react to that? They will look for 
enemies, scapegoats. According to Kirienko, Makashov's recent comments were 
meant to serve as a trial balloon. That attempt clearly failed, so they will look for 
other enemies: bankers, liberal reformers, foreign economic advisers, or the 
West. 
 
Kirienko identified three possible scenarios for renewed reform: 
1) An honest public appraisal of the depth and breadth of the problem and the 
consequences of the solution. 
2) The use of populism to disguise the difficult policies. This was attempted by 
Lech Walesa in Poland, and to some extent by Yel'tsin in Russia. 
3) "When the patient is tied up, there is no need for anesthesia," or the Pinochet 
solution. 
 
The Russians will hold onto the idea that no solution is necessary as long as 
possible. If any outsider "tries to force a solution, he will easily become that 
scapegoat." 
 
The best policy for the West is to let the Russians choose their own path but to 
keep certain doors open. The most important "doors" are: 1) Restructuring the 
former USSR debt. (The interest on the debt is $17 billion which equals 10% of 
Russia's GDP.) 2) Extending the agreement with the World Bank and the IMF to 
supply additional credits. These loans must be based on stringent conditions, but 
in principle they should be available. 3) The possibility, after having met the 
relevant conditions, of allowing Russia into the World Trade Organization. 
 
In the past IMF aid was used to cover the budget deficit. Since the budget 
supported inefficient enterprises, the money was wasted. IMF credits should be 
targeted at "restructuring the economy in order to achieve a balanced budget." 
The Russian government should be held responsible for how the money was 
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spent. Western credits could have been put to better uses but "the blame for this 
lies with Russia." 
 
There is the possibility of the first option, a forthright approach to the nation's 
problems, but this will require a change in the consciousness of the electorate. 
Already 61% of the population are economically independent of the government. 
They need to draw political conclusions from their financial independence. The 
generation which grew up during the reform lacks the habits of political action. 
"We have the political institutions, we need to learn to use them," he told the 
forum, hosted by Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian Studies. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough 
 
Primakov watch out! Franco Frattini has your number  
Franco Frattini, chairman of the Italian Chamber of Deputies Intelligence 
Services Committee, in an interview with an Italian journalist stated that Moscow 
is behind the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) Chairman Abdullah Ocalan affair. 
Frattini said that Moscow staged the affair and that "Primakov skillfully turned a 
cumbersome guest into a successful [covert] operation. After taking him in to 
help Syria, he [Primakov] found himself in a tight corner on account of the 
pressure being brought to bear by Ankara. First he attempted to send him to 
Athens, but since he was unsuccessful there, he set up the arrival in Italy. " 
Frattini went on further to describe what he referred to as a "heaven-sent short 
circuit" between Italy and Turkey, two countries he described as "the NATO allies 
that are showing the greatest commitment in the Balkans." The undermining of 
this solidarity plays right into the hands of Moscow, which is "pulling the strings of 
the Serbian-Russian-Greek alliance." Frattini also stated that not only was 
Primakov able to get rid of an "undesired guest whose presence exposed him to 
the risk of having to engage in a trial of strength with Ankara," but also 
 9 
"consolidated the solidarity between the Italian, Russian, and Kurdish 
communists." (La Stampa, 1 Dec 98, p. 7; FBIS-WEU-98-335) 
 
Russia: Stabilization Force member or NATO antagonist? 
The Russian foreign ministry is protesting the detention by Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) troops of Lt. Gen. Radislav Krstic, commander of the Republika Srpska's 
(incorporated in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 5th Corps. The foreign ministry 
statement highlighted the fact that it was NATO forces that detained Krstic and 
not members of the Russian brigade serving in the international Stabilization 
Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia has denounced and distanced itself 
from the arrest, which it described as a NATO activity even though the list of war 
criminals was compiled by the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 
headquartered in The Hague. Additionally the Russian brigade commander sent 
a strong protest to the command of NATO forces in Bosnia because Krstic was 
detained in the area protected by the Russian brigade without clearance from the 
brigade command. (Interfax, 1455 GMT, 3 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-337) 
 
Although there have been no allegations made of the Russian brigade 
deliberately protecting suspected war criminals in its sector, it is widely known 
that it will not detain suspected war criminals. The Russian commanders on the 
ground and the Russian foreign ministry have repeatedly stated that such actions 
should only be carried out by the parties involved and not SFOR.  
 
Russian-Cuban relations reforming? 
During an official visit to Cuba, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi 
Mamedov stated that conditions are shaping up to renew mutual ties between 
Russia and Cuba. The deputy minister said that the two countries "have passed 
a very difficult period of breaking up former relations and their transition to a 
more reliable foundation of concurring national interests." Apparently Mamedov 
did consider the Russian radar station in Cuba as constituting a reliable 
foundation on which to build mutual understanding between the two countries, 
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while recognizing the strategic role that the station plays for Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 
1110 GMT, 19 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-323) Additionally the deputy foreign 
minister may not have been informed by the atomic ministry that a fairly reliable 
foundation of concurring national interests has been in place for quite some time. 
Plans have been on the table for nearly a year to resume work on a nuclear 
power plant in Cuba that was started during Soviet times. The deputy also 
overlooked the fact that Moscow consistently champions the Cuban cause to 
have US sanctions against Cuba lifted. 
 
Iran's nuclear program must be peaceful; the Russians keep saying so 
Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin stated, once again, that 
Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear sphere "is of strictly peaceful 
character and fully complies with Moscow's international obligations in the field of 
nuclear non-proliferation." These latest comments were made in defense of a 
Russian nuclear energy ministry delegation led by Minister Yevgeni Adamov to 
Iran in late November. (ITAR-TASS, 1507 GMT, 26 Nov 98; FBIS-TAC-98-330) 
Even though the nuclear project is strictly "peaceful," Adamov revealed in a 
November 23 statement perhaps the more lucrative, diplomatic nature the project 
has acquired. He said his country was determined to continue nuclear 
cooperation with Iran and that "Russia pursues an independent foreign policy, 
and we believe that our relations with Iran are long-term." (Interfax, 1845 GMT, 
24 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-328) 
 
Russian-Japanese cooperation reaffirmed at summit 
With the summit in the front of their minds, Russia and Japan have signed a 
cooperation agreement providing for the formation of an international public 
organization linking the Russian 21st Century Committee and the Forum of 
Japanese Russian Friendship for the 21st Century. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov 
and his Japanese counterpart Ishio Sakurauti signed the documents which 
provide for cooperation on political, economic, scientific, and regional exchanges. 
A joint news publication has also been established in association with the plan. 
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(Interfax, 1140 GMT, 17 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-321) Since the summit, both the 
Japanese and Russians have backed away from extreme approaches to the 
territorial issue, allowing progress to be made in other areas of cooperation. 
(Interfax, 1042 GMT, 19 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-323) 
 
Sino-Russian summit concludes without fanfare 
During Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Russia, the two countries jointly 
issued three documents aimed at improving Sino-Russian relations. The 
documents, titled "Sino-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century," "Joint 
Statement on Sino-Russian Border Issues" and "Joint News Communique," were 
accompanied by a Russian pledge not to support Taiwanese independence or 
the concept of "two Chinas." (Ta Kung Pau, 30 Nov 98; FBIS-CHI-98-334) 
 
North Korea-Russia sign plan for 'professional exchanges' 
Russia has signed a document with North Korea meant to enhance 
intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of science, technology, culture, and 
the economy. As part of the agreement, the foreign ministries will regularly 
exchange information on "domestic situations and foreign policy activities." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1215 GMT, 1 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-335) Cooperation in these 
areas could afford Russia a singularly useful diplomatic link with the DPRK 
government. On the other end of the peninsula, Russia negotiated the payment 
of up to US $63 million in debts owed to South Korea in commodities. (Yonhap, 
0612 GMT, 20 Nov 98; FBIS-EAS-98-324) Russia's efforts to widen relations on 
both sides of the DMZ in the past few years have been largely successful due to 
the emphasis of strategic and policy-oriented exchanges with the north and 
economic cooperation with the south. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Parties and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Polls suggest a different Duma if elections were held today 
According to poll results published by the Public Opinion Foundation on 1 
November, if elections to the State Duma were held today, only two parties which 
won seats from national party lists in 1995 would remain in the Duma--the CPRF 
with 23 percent (a little more that the 22.3 percent the party won in 1995 
elections) and Grigori Yavlinsky's Yabloko party with 13 percent (twice the 7 
percent it received in 1995). Two of the more indomitable parties of the present 
Duma--Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic Party and former Prime 
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's Our Home is Russia--would net less than the 5 
percent needed to be seated in the Duma, with 4 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively. Such a result would be a significant setback from the 11.18 percent 
received by the Liberal Democrats and the 10+ percent won by Our Home is 
Russia in 1995. 
 
The Agrarian Party and the People's Power Party, presently in the Duma due to 
individual party members being returned from single-member districts, would, as 
in 1995, not receive enough support to overcome the five-percent hurdle. Two 
new parties, however, would see representation in the Duma if elections were 
held today. The Russian People's Republican Party of Aleksandr Lebed would 
garner 11 percent, and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who until recently did not 
even have a party, would receive 9 percent. Luzhkov's new party is called 
Fatherland. (NTV, 1800 GMT, 8 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-312) 
 
When interpreting these opinion poll results, it is important to remember that, 
unless the present method of election changes, these numbers represent only 
half of the seats in the Duma. The other half of the Duma is elected from single-
member districts and as all politics are local, the parties not given seats from the 
national party lists might well see representation in a future Duma through single-
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member election. However, such parties would have only marginal influence in 
the Duma. 
 
Communists continue to push for government control of the media 
The leaders of three left-wing parties in the Duma--Gennadi Zyuganov of the 
Communist Party, Nikolai Ryzhkov of the People's Rule group, and Nikolai 
Kharitonov of the Agrarian Party--have called on the government to control the 
state-owned television channels ORT and RTR. 
 
Not realizing the apparent contradiction, the Communists and their supporters 
simultaneously call for the establishment of supervisory boards to monitor media 
content while vigorously denying that this means censorship. Why is such 
"supervision" necessary? According to the above-mentioned letter, media outlets 
"are pushing through the tendencious [sic] stands taken by their management 
and their owners, including their open animosity towards the [Primakov] 
government The anti-communism of Nikolai Svanidze and other anchormen on 
the RTR is pathological and odious. The pro-NATO and anti-Serbian reports on 
NTV Independent Television about the crisis in Kosovo and the openly pro-Israeli 
interpretation of developments in the Middle East may cause [civil?] protest. The 
small political minority that has usurped the media is cynically manipulating the 
public opinion against the interests of the state." (Interfax, 1359 GMT, 11 Nov 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-315) 
 
Surely it is comforting for the citizens of Russia, as well as the international 
community, to have self-appointed authorities on what exactly constitutes the 
interests of the Russian people. In fact, the Communists are less interested in 
what the media think of international events than they are about the campaign 
coverage they will receive in the run-up to the 1999 Duma elections. The 
Communists assume that Primakov will save them from the anti-communist bias 
seen in election coverage in the past. 
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REGIONS 
Kirpichnikov discusses regional responses to the crisis 
In an interview, Minister of Regional Policy Valeri Kirpichnikov confirmed the 
suspicion that things in the regions are worse than they may appear. While 
noting that "all conflicts [in the regions] start with money and then evolve into 
interpersonal battles," Kirpichnikov pointed to a potentially dangerous situation 
created, or rather exacerbated, by the recent passage of the Budget Code. 
According to the code, the regions are responsible for disbursing 40 percent of 
the combined Russian budget (up from 14 percent), but are allowed only 1 
percent of the combined budget income in the form of local taxes. The 
substantial difference is supposed to be covered by money transfers from 
Moscow, which are clearly not happening. Most disturbing is the message the 
lopsided Budget Code sends. Moscow apparently has a shaky grip on the 
financial realities of the federation, as well as little understanding of how to run a 
modern state. (Interfaks-AiF, 23-29 Oct 98, No. 43, p. 2; FBIS-SOV-98-313) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Michael Reardon and Charles Drummond 
 
That's my story and I'm sticking to it! 
For some time now, officials high in the Russian Federation government have 
been stating that ten of Russia's strategic gems of the 21st century, the Topol-M 
(classified by NATO as SS-27s), would be operational by the end of 1998. This 
appeared to be a lofty, clearly unattainable goal--at least before last month. Until 
that point, the Russians only had two Topol-Ms "in service" at the Tatishchevo 
Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) base near Saratov, and they had been delivered 
at the end of 1997. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 17) Visible progress in 1998 
was nonexistent, as their only test launch up to late October 1998 ended in 
failure. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 16) Then, in what looked like a face-
saving measure, it was reported that the Strategic Missile Forces had taken 
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delivery of five additional missiles and put them in service on a "trial basis." (See 
Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 17) 
 
Russian Federation Defense Minister Igor Sergeev added to that total earlier this 
month when he stated that eight missiles had already been supplied to the SMF. 
He again expressed confidence that ten Topol-M intercontinental ballistic 
missiles would be supplied to the SMF by the end of year -- less than a month 
away. (Interfax, 1240 GMT, 1 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-335) At the same time, 
Sergeev reported that the 104th missile regiment of the SMF's 60th division had 
added the Topol-M launching complex to its arsenal to guide and control these 
powerhouse missiles. This launching complex consists not only of the control 
systems, but also the maintenance systems for the missiles and launch pads. 
(Interfax, 1240 GMT, 1 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-335)  
 
Whether the eight missiles currently "in service" at Tatishchevo could be 
successfully launched to support a mission can be debated; however, the 
Russians are one step closer to putting their much-desired ten in their respective 
holes by the end of the year. It is becoming increasing evident that the military is 
pulling out the stops, making every possible attempt to reach this goal, even as 
many other parts of the armed forces simultaneously deteriorate at an alarming 
rate. 
 
The fact that air force pilots receive about one-third of their required flight 
training, or that the navy has numerous ships literally rotting in port, or that a 
significant portion of the armed forces doesn't know if next month's paychecks 
will appear, or any other deficiency indicative of a poorly maintained force, 
appears secondary to the Russian desire to have a state-of-the-art nuclear 
arsenal. The current power brokers may believe this capability is their only hope 
of retaining any say-so in global happenings, a shell of their once credible 
superpower status. However, this strategy may be analogous to an investor with 
a portfolio that contains a single risky stock, bought on margin. If tests on the SS-
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27 continue the current unsuccessful trend and if the economy dips much lower, 
Russia may not be able to pay the margin call. 
 
Military reform becomes 'military deform' without funding 
In mid-November, the Duma adopted the second reading of a federal law "on 
military reform in the Russian Federation." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1135 
GMT, 18 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-322) The aims of military reform, according to 
the law, are to create a single military organization in the Russian Federation and 
to increase its combat and mobilizational readiness as well as its fighting 
capability. It is also designed to bring the state's military potential in line with the 
current requirements of the state's defense and security. Under the law, the 
Russian president determines the time scale of military reform, its content, and 
measures. He also is in charge of how the reform is carried out and controls the 
way implementing bodies fulfill these measures. Financing for the reforms is 
dependent on the federal budget and is determined by the type and extent of the 
reform measures required for the given year. The final version of the law was 
actually passed on 2 December 1998 by a unanimous vote of the Duma. (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 1014 GMT, 2 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-336) The law also 
contains provisions for the social protection of servicemen and their families. 
 
Neither report cited above provided specific details of the law. If history is any 
indication, the true test of progress on this military reform law will be seen in the 
specifics of how the law is tied to the budget. Over the past five or six years, 
progress on military reform in Russia has been slowed significantly by 
inadequate budget appropriation (or distribution). Removal and disposition of 
equipment, troop cutbacks, organizational or basing changes, etc., all take some 
amount of upfront financing. The old adage, "it takes money to make money," is 
certainly germane in this case and it appears Russia just isn¹t willing or able to 
devote the necessary resources. Aleksei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State 
Duma¹s Defense Committee, recently said, "The 2.6% of the GDP earmarked for 
defense next year [1999] will not suffice for implementing military reform or 
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maintaining the country's defense capacity." (Interfax, 1123 GMT, 2 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-336) This disparity is exacerbated by the current Russian 
government's almost obsessive desire to field a credible, modernized nuclear 
arsenal of $35 million+ Topol-M missiles at the speed of heat. It is difficult to 
believe that any significant progress will be made toward reform over the short 
term without a change in funding strategy or increase in budget. Barring this, I 
would have to agree with Arbatov's statement that "without further reform, the 
army will collapse shortly." (Interfax, 1123 GMT, 2 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-336) 
 
Anyone who jumps out of a perfectly good plane would have to be a dummy 
The AN-70 transport aircraft, a Ukrainian-Russian joint venture, recently 
progressed a couple of steps closer (or more appropriately a couple of jumps 
closer) to European acceptance. German Federal Chancellor Gerhardt 
Schroeder met with Russian governors on 17 November and discussion of the 
AN-70 was on the agenda. Samara Governor Konstantin Titov relayed that 
Schroeder "listened and took a note." (ITAR-TASS, 1607 GMT, 17 Nov 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-321) Furthermore, Titov said, "Thanks to that, the project will be 
supported. The large-scale project of the production of the AN-70 military cargo 
aircraft, which used to be Russian-Ukrainian, will now become Russian-
Ukrainian-German." (ITAR-TASS, 1607 GMT, 17 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-321) 
Titov's optimism may be just a bit more biased than other Russian governors, 
especially since one of the two production locations for the AN-70 plane happens 
to be in his region (the other being in Gostomel, just outside of Kyiv). Whether 
Germany will ultimately support the aircraft is yet to be seen, however, the 
German defense ministry is seriously considering it, analyzing its potential as the 
basic model for the next-generation European transport. On 1 December, an 
exercise was staged at the testing ground in Gostomel. The exercise involved 
dropping mannequins from the aircraft, using standard German parachutes. 
Engineers from Germany's Daimler Chrysler Aerospace group have determined 
that the AN-70 meets their requirements, although its cargo handling equipment 
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has to be improved and the cockpit redesigned. (Interfax, 1119 GMT, 2 Dec 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-336) 
 
Use of the AN-70 as the European standard transport plane would certainly 
boost an ailing Russian arms export industry, through widespread and possible 
long-term sales. Acceptance of such an integral asset could also keep Russia's 
"foot in the door" for follow-on sales. However, European acceptance is not a 
prerequisite for continued production of this aircraft. The demand in the CIS 
member states is estimated at 600 planes, of which Russia will purchase 150. 
Another 300 planes may be sold in the Middle East. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, 
No. 12.) The solid AN-70 may have the opportunity to be the workhorse of intra-
European theater transport for some time.  
 
Anchors away 
One of the interesting turn of events from the end of the Cold War is that the 
United States is actively helping Russia to destroy nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems. The latest such example was reported by the Voice of Russia World 
Service, which described a visit by US Senator Richard Lugar to Severodvinsk. 
There, the senator and his delegation watched three submarines being cut up, 
the work being paid for by the US. The news report was a positive story, 
emphasizing the spirit of cooperation in dismantling, safely, the submarines. Also 
noted was the backlog of decommissioned submarines, currently at 96, with 
another 90 or so more expected to be added to that list by the year 2000. (Voice 
of Russia World Service, 1510 GMT, 21 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-326) Unstated 
was that, even with this US help, the task of safely cutting up all of these vessels 
and disposing of the spent nuclear fuel remains extremely daunting. The Russian 
government is too broke to handle the problem. 
 
The news report was timely. Recently, several major US newspapers have 
discussed the problem of Russia's nuclear waste, primarily related to the 
dismantling of the nuclear-powered submarines. The challenges are severe; the 
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ecological consequences potentially disastrous. Briefly, in addition to the lack of 
money and sheer number of submarines awaiting destruction, Russia has 
extremely poor storage conditions, and inadequate transportation for moving the 
spent fuel to designated containment sites. So, even though the US is helping 
Russia to get rid of some relics of the Cold War, there is still so much more that 
needs to be done, and not enough money to do it. 
 
Pasko's notes published 
A reporter for Literaturnaya gazeta recently obtained access to former Navy 
Captain Grigori Pasko's drafts of articles that charge the Russian Pacific Fleet 
with "corruption and ecological crimes." (Literaturnaya gazeta, 4 Nov 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-320) Pasko, now a military journalist, has been held in confinement for 
over a year in Vladivostok on charges of treason. (See Editorial Digest, 4 Nov 98) 
With methods reminiscent of those used in the case of another former Navy 
captain, Aleksandr Nikitin, the charges against Pasko are considered "top secret" 
and thus are unavailable for scrutiny. Reading Pasko's notes makes the reasons 
clear: If accurate, his notes are both extremely embarrassing and potentially 
quite damning in detailing rampant corruption by both military and civilian 
officials.  
 
Pasko raises some serious questions in regards to the selling, ostensibly for 
scrap, of "obsolete" warships. Some of what he alleges may be aboveboard; it is 
quite reasonable for a navy to sell off obsolete vessels for scrap. The US has 
disposed of many old aircraft carriers in this manner. Even given that some of the 
scrap purchases were legitimate, Pasko alleges that military officials sold off the 
ships at bargain-basement prices, for "essentially next to nothing." Pasko also 
believes that ships were sold with valuable metals, equipment, and possibly even 
classified publications remaining on board. For all of the above to have taken 
place, collusion amongst many agencies and departments would have been 
required. It's easy to see how authorities do not want to bring Pasko's allegations 
to a public arena. 
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Of much more concern is Pasko's detailing of ecological dangers. The list of 
abuses is frightening: toxic chemical containers being disposed of at sea since 
the 1950s; leaking containers of rocket fuel poisoning earth and water; and 
disposing of liquid radioactive waste into the Pacific Ocean.  
 
Literaturnaya gazeta closed the article with essentially an invitation to Russian 
authorities to counter Pasko's charges "fact against fact." The paper is not 
holding its presses in anticipation of a response. The wait continues as to 
Pasko's fate. Unfortunately it will be a much longer wait to see how, if at all, the 
issues he raises are resolved. 
 
Wages, crime, and suicide 
The Russian government continues to make good on its pledge to pay the 
military on a regular schedule: The latest payout was announced on 1 December. 
The troops were paid for October, with November's arrears to follow shortly. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0914 GMT, 1 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-335) The bad news is that four 
months of steady payment is not enough to stem growing skepticism of the 
government by the military. In addition, recently released crime statistics 
concerning the armed forces have been tied directly to the money situation. 
 
The independent military newspaper Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie reported 
on a two-day assembly in mid-November of Russian flag officers that included 
talks with Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov and other high officials. One quote by 
the reporter concisely sums up the situation: "Apathy and bitterness is the state 
in which the military find themselves today." The article suggested that the 
officers saw some reason for hope in Primakov's statements that the money 
situation would get better, but still they "were skeptical of routine promises" made 
concerning debt settlement. Quite clearly, having to wait for a monthly 
announcement to find out if you are going to be paid for that month cannot 
inspire much loyalty if you are a soldier or sailor, regardless of rank. As the article 
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put it, "Many service members no longer have a moral or material motive to 
serve." (Nezavisimoe voyennoe obozrenie, 13-19 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-335) 
That in turn leads us to the next article, concerning Russian armed forces crime 
figures. 
 
Interfax published the 1998 Russian military crime statistics as announced by the 
Ministry of Defense. Taken in the context of Russia's economic and political 
situations, and in comparison with last year, there is nothing really remarkable 
about the figures. Overall "crimes and incidents" have gone up from 10,000 in 
1997 to 10,500 in 1998; however, broken down by categories, some areas 
showed improvement over the past year. One telling exception, though, is 
suicides in the armed forces, most of which (over 60% of about 350 cases) were 
by officers. The report is quite blunt in stating the cause: "delayed payment of 
salaries and the poverty of servicemen's families." (Interfax, 1104 GMT, 1 Dec 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-335) If these figures are reliable, the real surprise is that the 
numbers are not higher. Throughout the year we have been reading in the 
Russian and Western press about the dismal state of the Russian military: the 
lack of pay, cut-off of services by the local utilities, the need to accept foreign aid 
(in the case of the Kaliningrad military district), and the list goes on. So, an 
optimist might see these figures as a good indication. To its credit, the Russian 
government is trying to improve the state of the military, but short of fixing the 
Russian economy overall, no long-term relief is in sight. Next year's statistics 
may be telling. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Berezovsky's scheme shot down 
After days of campaigning throughout the CIS, Executive Secretary Boris 
Berezovsky presented his CIS reorganization proposal at the CIS Heads of State 
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Meeting in Moscow. Berezovsky undertook his last-minute "working trip" to 
"create a basis for joint work on joint interests." During the trip, Berezovsky 
boasted of Russian and CIS-wide presidential support for his efforts on several 
occasions. In reference to Russian President Boris Yel'tsin, Berezovsky 
commented, "the President is convinced that it is necessary to reduce the 
management and executive structures of the Commonwealth." (ITAR-TASS, 
2050 GMT, 20 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-324) From Yerevan, he boasted that all the 
heads of government with whom he had met most recently--Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia--supported his proposals. (Snark, 
1100 GMT, 19 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-323) 
 
Although the concept of reorganization has been supported by the CIS member 
states, it was clear at the Heads of State meeting that Berezovsky's proposal 
enjoyed negligible support. The plan envisioned a CIS-wide free-trade area and 
the institution of a single coordinating center called the Executive Committee 
(EC) that would be led by Berezovsky himself. Also included were the elimination 
of a number of redundant CIS agencies and a 40% reduction of CIS staff. As 
envisioned by Berezovsky, the EC would "unite the economic, political and other 
sectors under a single roof." As such, the Coordinating Staff for Military 
Cooperation, the Staff of the Border Troops' Commanders' Council, the 
Collective Security Council and a proposed CIS Committee on Conflict Situations 
would also be subordinate to the Berezovsky Economic Committee. 
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 Nov 98 and ITAR-TASS, 25 Nov 98; nexis) In effect, 
this would create a CIS supranational structure over which Berezovsky could 
exert extraordinary control. 
 
Russian Prime Minister Primakov, Foreign Minister Ivanov and CIS Cooperation 
Minister Pastukhov opposed the plan. While Primakov did not object to renaming 
the Executive Secretariat, he stressed that its work would be limited to 
"coordination and administrative work" and "drafting the strategy and tactics of 
CIS development." (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 Nov 98; nexis) 
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In a seemingly unrelated but interesting development, the Duma passed a 
second vote on a resolution calling for Berezovsky's dismissal as CIS executive 
secretary. The resolution will now be sent to the Federation Council, CIS Council 
of Heads of State and the Prosecutor General. (Interfax, 2 Dec 98; nexis) Duma 
member Yevgeni Maksimov originally initiated the effort in early November due to 
"concern in the public opinion over the situation in the CIS." However, it seems 
that Berezovsky's call to ban the Communist Party was the real fuel behind the 
Duma initiative. (Interfax, 1723 GMT, 18 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-322) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The year the power went out 
Residents throughout Ukraine are facing the possibility of going through the 
winter with only periodic electricity. About one-and-one-half months ago, the 
Russian and Ukrainian electric power grids were disconnected from each other. 
From the almost complete lack of concern generated by Ukrainian politicians at 
the time, it seemed that the disconnection was simply an administrative move. It 
has become obvious, however, that this is far from simply an administrative 
problem, as one after another Ukrainian city experiences power outages. 
 
It seems that the electricity from the Russian grid was used regularly to 
supplement power produced in Ukraine's own facilities, and to stave off 
shortages. When Russia insisted, due to Ukrainian debt, that the grids be 
disconnected, homes throughout Ukraine began going dark for various portions 
of the day and night. 
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Deputy Minister of Energy Vladimir Darchuk recently explained that, whenever 
the power grid's capacity becomes too great, the entire power system begins to 
shut down automatically. But, the disconnection of the electric grids is not the 
only problem. 
 
The country's thermal power stations only have 11 days of fuel left at most. Only 
nine out of 14 nuclear power plant "generating sets" are in working order. Water 
reserves are drying up for the country's hydroelectric plants, and the country 
does not have enough coal. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 Nov 98) 
The town of Sevastopol has recently begun to cut off power for several hours 
during each day to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which is said to owe at least 13 
million rubles for its electricity consumption over the last several years. (Mayak 
Radio Network, 0420 GMT, 30 Nov 98; FBIS-UMA-98-337) Just last week, the 
fleet's headquarters had its power cut off for two full days. Russia has been 
surprisingly quiet about the fleet outages, perhaps recognizing that its decision to 
disconnect the grids helped to cause the situation. 
 
Other towns throughout the country are also trying to manage outages by 
deliberately cutting off electricity to individual homes and businesses at certain 
times every day. The Associated Press has reported that the temperature in 
many areas of Ukraine during the day has dropped to as low as 5 degrees 
Fahrenheit. (AP Worldstream, 0922 EST, 1 Dec 98) 
 
In response to the crisis, President Leonid Kuchma announced plans to privatize 
the country's energy companies. (AP Worldstream, 0706 EST, 25 Nov 98) The 
government has also begun cutting the amount of energy being sent to 
neighboring Moldova. In addition, the energy ministry has announced that 
Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor No. 3, the only reactor still operating at the plant, will 
continue to operate even though the country's Nuclear Regulatory Administration 
has ordered it shut down for safety reasons. The ministry said that entire sections 
of Ukraine would be completely without power if Reactor No. 3 were to be shut 
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down. Perhaps Anatoly Holubchenko, the first deputy prime minister, put it best 
when he said that the situation now depends "on us and on God." (Holos 
Ukrayini, 18 Nov 98, p. 1; FBIS-SOV-98-323, and AP Worldstream, 0922 EST, 1 
Dec 98) 
 
Buenos dias! Me llamo Pavlo 
It appears that Pavlo Lazarenko has come to the end of the line. The former 
Ukrainian premier was arrested in Switzerland last week when he tried to cross 
the French-Swiss border using a Panamanian passport. 
 
Lazarenko, the head of the ultra-leftist Hromada Party, served as prime minister 
from 1996-1997, when President Kuchma fired him for alleged corruption. Since 
February, Ukraine has been investigating Lazarenko for money laundering and 
has accused him of embezzling up to $20 million from both the Ukrainian state 
accounts and the energy company he runs, United Energy Systems. It had been 
doubtful that much could be done, however, since Lazarenko still sits in 
parliament and therefore enjoys full immunity in Ukraine. In fact, the parliament 
has refused to lift his immunity, despite frequent requests to do so over the last 
six months by President Kuchma.  
 
The investigating Swiss judge, though, told AP that "the charges against 
Lazarenko ... are related to an inquiry by Geneva officials and were not linked to 
proceedings which have been opened in Kyiv." Translation: no immunity. (AP 
Worldstream, 1341 EST, 4 Dec 98) Agence France-Presse also reported that 
authorities in Kyiv "have requested Swiss judicial aid in about 20 cases 
concerning funds stashed in Switzerland." (AFP, 1251 GMT, 3 Dec 98; FBIS-
WEU-98-337) Too bad. Perhaps Lazarenko should have practiced that 
Panamanian look just a little bit more. 
 
BELARUS 
Who needs food? We've got Lukashenka! 
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In early November, President Lukashenka claimed the Belarusian economy grew 
11 percent last year, and 11 percent so far this year. Apparently, that's all that 
has grown in Belarus lately. 
 
Lukashenka this week "demanded that his subordinates should solve the food 
problem once and for all." He told the nation that the government (which 
apparently does not include himself) "has two days left to get foodstuffs back into 
the shops." Otherwise, he said, there will be "major personnel changes." (NTV, 
0900 GMT, 28 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-332)  
 
Lukashenka has repeatedly denied in the past several months that his country is 
suffering from food shortages. When, on 18 September, the Belarusian Business 
Journal said that Belarus was dangerously short of basic food items, the 
government vehemently denied that there was a problem. However, the problem 
has simply become too large to hide. 
 
The price of milk and dairy products has increased almost 13 percent in 
November, while most other food is approaching the average European level. 
(Interfax, 1147 GMT, 1 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-335) Meanwhile, the average 
Belarusian wage remains at under $40 per month. (AP Online, 1948 EST, 8 Nov 
98) The currency has devalued so drastically that the government will soon begin 
issuing a banknote with the denomination of 500,000 Belarusian rubles. On the 
black market, one dollar is worth BR100,000. (Interfax, 3 Dec 98; nexis) 
 
The Minsk city government has responded to the problem by creating "special 
closed shops," where its workers can buy eggs, dairy products and meat. All 
companies in Minsk are expected to contribute to a fund to purchase the 
products. (Interfax, 3 Dec 98; nexis) 
 
Lukashenka was able to use his "influence," however, to stop a massive protest 
by the trade union federation over food shortages. More than 30,000 workers 
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were expected to take part in the protest and march. Lukashenka went to the 
factory center personally to "persuade" the workers not to protest. The Russian 
state-run NTV reporter said, "The President's words found a response. Having 
stood in queues for hours, people are no longer demanding that food be put back 
in the shops; they are asking for ration cards and order lists to be introduced at 
enterprises, like in Soviet times." (NTV, 1300 GMT, 2 Dec 98; FBIS-SOV-98-336) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Economy, energy sector, and prime minister on verge of collapse 
What a few weeks it has been for Moldova, as the economy continues its decent 
into chaos: 
 
First, Moldova announced a decision to cut the number of its army recruits by 
two-thirds, to just 600, because it cannot pay the soldiers. "The reduction has 
been a deliberate step necessitated by the country's grave economic situation," a 
defense ministry spokesman said. But, he added, "This will not influence the 
Army's combat ability." (Infotag, 1745 GMT, 17 Nov 98; FBIS-UMA-98-321) 
Shortly after, Moldova announced that it was "unilaterally" reducing the number 
of its peacekeepers in the Dniestr region to 500. (Infotag, 1730 GMT, 19 Nov 98; 
FBIS-UMA-98-323) This was the second announced reduction of peacekeepers 
by Moldova in two months, but Russia and Dniestr, which have peacekeepers in 
the region, have not reciprocated. 
 
In the meantime, Ukraine announced its decision to reduce electricity sent to 
Moldova by 60 percent. Gazprom announced that Moldova's debt has increased 
by another $47 million since the beginning of 1998, and threatened (then backed 
off) to reduce the amount of electricity sent from Russia. At the same time, the 
national television station cut its on-air time from 18 hours per day to just 5-6, 
because of a shortage of funds. (Basapress, 1800 GMT, 17 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-321) 
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Finally, Moldova confirmed that Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc has been hospitalized. 
The media service said that he had been hospitalized for "preventive treatment," 
but that "rumors appeared in Chisinau that Ciubuc's state of health has worsened 
sharply. However, no details are available so far." (Infotag, 2045 GMT, 18 Nov 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-322) 
 
On 24 November, there was finally some good news: Romania began supplying 
electricity to Moldova. (Rompres, 1147 GMT, 23 Nov 98; FBIS-EEU-98-327) The 
supply is not enough, however, to prevent various areas of Moldova from being 
without power at certain times of the day. 
 
Although there have been one or two written messages to the people "from 
Ciubuc," there has been no word to date on the prime minister's medical 
condition. One can only hope that it's better than Moldova's economy. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Latest OSCE proposal fails  
Armenia and Karabakh accepted the latest set of initiatives for Nagorno-
Karabakh which were introduced recently by the OSCE Minsk Group co-
chairmen. Azerbaijan, however, rejected the new formula based on the concept 
of a "common state." Apparently the OSCE suggested that Nagorno-Karabakh 
and Azerbaijan can join to constitute a new "common state. " This formulation 
endows Karabakh with sovereignty and was therefore endorsed by the Armenian 
side and rejected by Azerbaijan. (Interfax, 1200 GMT, 26 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
330) Azerbaijan has already indicated that it would prefer to return to the process 
which the OSCE outlined last fall, which was rejected by the Armenian side. 
(Interfax, 1638 GMT, 20 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-324) It is unclear where the 
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Minsk process will go from here, but the issue was on the agenda for the Oslo 
meeting of the OSCE foreign ministers in December. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Elchibey accuses Aliev and Primakov of setting up the PKK 
The local prosecutor initiated a case of libel against the chairman of the People's 
Front of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, after he told journalists that "one of the 
founders of the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] is Heydar Aliyev," and repeated 
the thought saying, "Heydar Aliyev and [Yevgeni] Primakov had a hand in 
establishing the PKK." (Azadlyg, 18 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-322) The government 
has challenged Elchibey to produce evidence of this claim, which so far he has 
failed to do. Instead, he has defended himself on the grounds that his remarks do 
not impair the president's dignity and honor, the protection of which is the explicit 
purpose of the relevant legislation. (Azadlyg, 14 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-322) 
 
For its part, the Democratic Congress, an umbrella group of several opposition 
parties, emphasized the reasoning behind Elchibey's claim. Its statement 
stressed that the "PKK is a communist-oriented Marxist organization, it was 
assisted by the Soviet KGB and the Communist Party." Since Azerbaijan is in 
close proximity to the countries where the PKK operates (Turkey, Syria, Iran, and 
Iraq), and Geidar Aliev was the head of the Azerbaijani party and KGB at the 
time the PKK was created, he must have helped the terrorist organization in its 
activities. A prominent member of the PKK, Semdin Sakyk, corroborated the 
existence of ties to Azerbaijan. (Azadlyg, 18 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-322) While 
Aliev's role is hotly debated in Azerbaijan, we're still waiting for Primakov's denial. 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia has emerged as a major 
supporter of the PKK and the Kurdish cause generally. When the whereabouts of 
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan were unknown, it was widely rumored that he had 
taken refuge in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Russian military bases in 
Armenia. (Zerkalo, 31 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-323, and see the previous issue of 
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the Editorial Digest) Frequent allegations from Azeri and Turkish politicians that 
Armenia continues to harbor PKK bases and provides safe passage for its 
fighters have been repeatedly denied by the Armenian authorities. The 
Azerbaijani news service, Turan, recently reported that 100 Kurdish fighters who 
fled from Syria were quartered in Russian military bases in Armenia, while 20 
more were settled in the Lachin region. (Turan, 1630 GNT, 10 Nov 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-316) 
 
Armenia has been the sight of other pro-Kurd activities. A rally 1,000 persons 
strong was held to commemorate the anniversary of the founding of the PKK; on 
another occasion several hundred showed up to demand the release of Ocalan, 
who is held in detention in Italy. (ITAR-TASS, 1908 GMT, 29 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-333, and ITAR-TASS, 2207 GMT, 16 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-320) Armenia's 
predisposition towards the Kurds stems from the sizable Kurdish minority, about 
60,000-strong, and a common enmity against Turkey. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAHSTAN 
Qazhegeldyn's conviction upheld by Supreme Court 
At the end of November, just a few days before the deadline for candidates' 
registration in the January 1999 presidential elections, Kazakhstan's Supreme 
Court ruled that former prime minister Aqezhan Qazhegeldyn's 27 October 
conviction on charges of violating the country's assembly law was valid. A 
municipal court had found him guilty of participating in the activities of an 
improperly registered political organization, the Free Elections Movement, and 
had ordered him to pay a fine. The Supreme Court's decision to uphold this 
conviction prevents Mr. Qazhegeldyn from running in the upcoming presidential 
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elections, or from running for any political office for the period of one year. 
(Interfax, 1150 GMT, 24 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-328) 
 
Comment 
Even if the Supreme Court had overturned the lower court's decision, Mr. 
Qazhegeldyn might still have been barred from the elections because of a recent 
second conviction. On 18 November, he was pronounced guilty of "disrespect for 
the court" and ordered to pay another fine on the grounds that he had not 
appeared in court to face the first set of charges against him. (Interfax, 1551 
GMT, 18 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-322) 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Tashkent, Moscow accused of aiding and abetting Col. Khudoiberdiev 
The Tajik government now claims to have irrefutable proof that both the Russian 
and Uzbek governments provided refuge to Col. Mahmud Khudoiberdiev, 
Abdumalik Abdullojonov, Abdughani Abdullojonov (Abdumalik Abdullojonov's 
younger brother and former mayor of Khujand), Yoqubjon Salimov (Tajikistan's 
former Customs Committee chairman, whose private militia attacked government 
troops in Dushanbe in August 1997), and a number of others for whom arrest 
warrants had been issued by Tajik law enforcement services. The three men 
named above are all wanted on charges of attempting to stage a coup d'etat 
against President Rakhmanov. The Tajik security services have stated that, 
following Col. Khudoiberdiev's latest armed incursion, they have obtained hard 
evidence that the Uzbek military and KNB (previously the KGB of the Uzbek 
SSR) provided refuge, training, and weapons to Col. Khudoiberdiev and his 
forces and even helped recruit additional personnel for his militia from General 
Abdulrashid Dostum's army. Abdumalik Abdullojonov is also accused of directly 
participating in the arming and organization of Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces. These 
accusations appear to be based largely on the testimony of prisoners captured 
from Col. Khudoiberdiev's militia. However, government officials have stated that 
documents which were seized from Khudoiberdiev's supporters prove the extent 
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of Uzbekistan's involvement in the affair. (Radio Tajikistan First Channel 
Network, 0600 GMT, 13 Nov 98; FBIS-UMA-98-320, and Tajikistan First Channel 
Network, 0600 GMT, 13 Nov 98; FBIS-UMA-98-321) Both the Russian and 
Uzbek governments have denied aiding Col. Khudoiberdiev, Abdumalik 
Abdullojonov, and their supporters in any way and claim to have no knowledge of 
their activities or whereabouts. (Khovar News Agency, 1330 GMT, 12 Nov 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-317, and Interfax, 1718 GMT, 10 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-314)  
 
Comment 
Col. Khudoiberdiev's attack on Khujand and Aini caused a great deal of material 
damage (approximately US $5.2 million in Leninobod Province alone--Interfax 
1026 GMT, 27 Nov 98, FBIS-SOV-98-331), as well as costing many lives, but 
from President Rakhmanov's point of view the net benefits in the end may 
outweigh the negative results. The Tajik president is now able to oppose openly 
the Uzbek government in its bid for influence over Tajikistan's affairs and his 
administration may have also gained a significant foothold in Leninobod 
Province. Little information is currently available about the present state of affairs 
in Tajikistan's northernmost region, but presumably the provincial capital, 
Khujand, is occupied by Tajik government troops (most likely by Presidential 
Guard units, who thus far have been fairly loyal to the Dushanbe administration) 
and the city may even be under martial law. As long as the government troops 
remain in Khujand, President Rakhmanov will be free to remove any local 
officials whom he deems to be disloyal by accusing them of having supported 
either Col. Khudoiberdiev or Abdumalik Abdullojonov. Thus, the president now 
has an opportunity to staff local government organs in Leninobod with personnel 
loyal to himself, and to quash immediately and forcibly any further opposition to 
his policies. If government troops continue to occupy Leninobod Province for a 
significant amount of time, the president may also be able to weaken the region's 
ties to Uzbekistan. 
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Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
LATVIA 
Anatomy of a government formation 
While the Saeima approved the minority government of Vilis Kristopans on 26 
November with a vote of 59 to 24, the process of government formation was not 
a smooth one, and indicates that the new prime minister will likely face harsh and 
strong opposition in the months to come. 
 
The nomination of Kristopans himself was the first indication of trouble. For one 
month after the 3 October elections, a coalition of three parties (Latvia's Way, For 
the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK, and the New Party) made it clear that he 
was the only candidate for the position that they would accept. With their 
combined total of 46 seats in parliament, this statement guaranteed that Andris 
Skele, leader of the People's Party (which received 24 seats, the most in the 
election) would not regain the position of prime minister that he once held. What 
became quite clear in the weeks after President Guntis Ulmanis named 
Kristopans prime minister designate was that, while Skele and his party were 
popular with the voters, fellow politicians were of a clearly different mind. 
 
After Ulmanis handed Kristopans a mandate to form a government on 3 
November, negotiations began. The People's Party proposed a majority 
government with itself and the three-party coalition backing Kristopans, provided 
that there was a coalition agreement in which only representatives of the parties 
forming the government held seats in the cabinet and that government and 
Saeima committee posts were filled on the basis of proportionality to the popular 
vote (which would favor the People's Party). (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 
1100 GMT, 11 Nov 98) 
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Kristopans quickly made clear how slim the chances were that the People's Party 
would hold a majority of government seats. Interviewed in a Riga newspaper, 
Kristopans declared that he remained offended by a pre-election advertisement 
in which the People's Party had included his name, along with bankers accused 
of fraudulent practices, under the inscription "Abuse of Service Authority." While 
describing the advertisement as slanderous, Kristopans said he would not sue--
not because he wished to calm troubled political waters, but because such legal 
actions rarely succeeded. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1900 GMT, 12 Nov 
98) 
 
Kristopans at first offered the People's Party three ministerial posts (foreign 
affairs, agriculture and justice), with no mention of a coalition agreement. (Baltic 
News Service Daily Report, 1900 GMT, 11 Nov 98) The Social Democrats 
Alliance, sensing that a fourth party had not yet been accepted into the 
government, announced its support of a majority government in which alliance 
members held at least three portfolios. (Baltic News Service, 1851 GMT, 16 Nov 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-320) While the introduction of the alliance into the coalition 
would bring about a majority government with 60 seats in parliament, alliance 
members overestimated the three-party coalition's desire to avoid a minority 
government. The alliance proposal was ignored. 
 
The following week, after apparently having accepted that strong possibility of a 
minority government, Kristopans made an offer the People's Party couldn't help 
but refuse: one post in the government (agriculture) that could be filled with 
anyone but party leader Andris Skele, no coalition agreement, and the assurance 
that a similar offer would be made to the Social Democrats Alliance, an alliance 
which the People's Party had steadfastly rejected. Moreover, the People's Party 
was given 30 minutes to decide. A People's Party representative described 
Kristopans' proposal as an expression of no confidence in the party. That 
perception was right on the money: "I don't see ...that the People's Party can be 
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fully trusted," Kristopans told reporters. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1900 
GMT, 19 Nov 98) 
 
The three parties in the original coalition signed a declaration that a coalition 
council would be formed in which all decisions would be unanimous. (Radio Riga 
Network, 1200 GMT, 20 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-98-324) That move sounded the 
death knell to any hopes of the Social Democrats: After the agreement on 
unanimity was signed, the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK party expressed its 
rejection (and therefore, that of the entire coalition) of involvement by the Social 
Democrats Alliance in the government. (BNS, 1019 GMT, 24 Nov 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-328) 
 
While the two groups may not have been able to work together, the People's 
Party and the Social Democrats did find some common ground, at least 
temporarily, as each announced that it would not support the cabinet formed by 
Kristopans in the upcoming parliamentary vote. (BNS, 1017 GMT, 24 Nov 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-328) At the last minute, however, the Social Democrats changed 
their position and voted for the government. 
 
The lineup of the Cabinet that was approved indicates that it was members of the 
People's Party, rather than the party's insistence that only government coalition 
members comprise the cabinet, that served as the stumbling block for a four-
party majority government. 
 
Cabinet members include: 
Latvia's Way: Prime Minister Andris Skele; Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs; 
Education and Science Minister Janis Gaigals; Finance Minister Ivars Godmanis; 
Culture Minister Karina Petersone; Transport Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
Anatolijs Gorbunovs; and State Revenue State Minister Aija Poca. 
For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK: Defense Minister Girts Kristovskis; 
Interior Minister Roberts Jurdzs; Environmental Protection and Regional 
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Development Minister Vents Balodis; Welfare Minister Vladimirs Makarovs; 
Special Tasks Minister for Cooperation with International Finance Institutions 
Roberts Zile; Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Guntars Krasts; 
and Environment State Minister Inese Vaidere. 
New Party: Justice Minister Ingrida Labucka; and Economics Minister Ainars 
Slesers. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE Daily Report, 1100 GMT, 26 Nov 98) 
 
LITHUANIA 
If at first you don't succeed, try another person 
Shortly after ending the trial of Aleksandras Lileikis due to the defendant's ill 
health, Vilnius District Court announced that it will try Kazys Gimzauskas for 
genocide against Jews during World War II. The former deputy chief of the 
Vilnius District Security Board (and, therefore, Lileikis' subordinate), Gimzauskas 
is charged with complicity in a crime and genocide against Lithuanian citizens. 
The first session of his trial is scheduled for 5 January 1999, however, health 
issues may again be raised: A medical examination determined that the 90-year-
old was unfit to stand an inquest. (Baltic News Service, 1329 GMT, 12 Nov 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-316) 
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